Game Theory and SWOT Analysis of GERD's Conflicts Impacts on Eastern Nile Countries (chapter in "The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry")
Publisher: Springer Link
Author(s): El-Sayed Ewis Omran and Abdelazim Negm
Date: 2023
Topics: Conflict Causes, Conflict Prevention, Dispute Resolution/Mediation, Governance, Land, Renewable Resources
Countries: Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda
Although the Nile is one of the world’s most powerful rivers, the river basin is shared by 11 nations. Only Egypt has historical rights under the Nile Water Agreement signed with Britain in 1929. There is no water sharing agreement between the basin countries about how the water should be distributed among them. Egypt systematized its legitimate status in an arrangement with Sudan in 1959. The development of the Grand Renaissance Dam, which began in 2011, resulted in tremendous clash between the two parties battling for the right to water, the downstream countries and the upstream countries. The downstream countries constitute the first group (Egypt and Sudan).The other group is in the upstream countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Southern Sudan, Rwanda, and Kenya).
This chapter has assessed the merits of three scenarios available to Egypt given the changes in the balance of power that has occurred between Egypt and Ethiopia. Game theory is used in this chapter for analyzing and understanding the strategic behavior of conflict countries and to guide conflict strategy. Non-cooperative game theory assumes that countries operate unilaterally to enhance their individual profits while keeping in mind the interconnectedness of their choices with the decisions of other countries. However, the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis, processed by the study, showed the strengths and weaknesses of the Nile Basin countries that could maximize or diminish the opportunities and threats of the proposed hydrological projects to be constructed on the river.
Out of these three scenarios, the third, a renegotiation of the 1929 and 1959 agreements, appears to be the best alternative. The most challenging yet most profitable scenario, the win-win-win, could not be realized in individual views, but rather in a cooperative system of mutual better transboundary water governance. Choosing scenario 3 will, however, demand making concessions on the rights and allocations secured in the 1929 and 1959 agreements.