Coltan, Congo & Conflict


Publisher: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Author(s): Artur Usanov, Marjolein de Ridder, Willem Auping, and Stephanie Lingemann

Date: 2013

Topics: Conflict Prevention, Dispute Resolution/Mediation, Extractive Resources, Governance

Countries: Congo (DRC)

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The report concludes that the importance of coltan as a source of revenue for armed groups is often exaggerated. With the exception of a short-lived coltan boom in 2000-2001, it was never a substantial source of funding for armed groups. Although armed groups have profited from the DRC’s mineral wealth, coltan was not the main instigator of the conflict in the DRC and was at most a contributing factor. 

Many policy initiatives aimed at breaking the link between mining, mineral trade and conflict, including Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., suffer from problems related to both effectiveness and efficiency. First of all, there is little convincing evidence that initiatives focusing on limiting the mineral revenue of armed groups are likely to lead to a significant reduction of violence in the DRC. We believe this is because many conflict mineral policy initiatives assume that mineral revenues are the main reason behind the continued fighting in eastern DRC. However, reducing the mineral revenue of armed groups primarily addresses symptoms of a deeper problem. As long as the underlying reasons for conflict continue to exist and the right governance structures to address grievances are lacking, rebels will simply shift from trade in minerals to other sources of revenue, such as taxing agriculture or foreign aid. There are obviously moral reasons for reducing the mineral revenues of armed groups. However, even in this case it is important to understand that challenges such as weak governance, corruption and large compliance costs, might easily undermine their successful implementation. 

The main problem in the DRC is the weakness of governance and the inability of the state to fulfill its basic functions. In such a context, ending the violence requires a long-term and comprehensive approach that combines miltary, political, and economic efforts, with a particular emphasis on building capable and legitimate institutions, restoring the state’s monopoly on violence, and promoting economic development that is not based on illegal activities.